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Capacity of the State-Dependent Wiretap Channel:
Secure Writing on Dirty Paper
Hamid G. Bafghi, Babak Seyfe, Mahtab Mirmohseni, Mohammad Reza Aref
Abstract—In this paper we consider the State-Dependent
Wiretap Channel (SD-WC). As the main idea, we model the
SD-WC as a Cognitive Interference Channel (CIC), in which
the primary receiver acts as an eavesdropper for the cognitive
transmitter’s message. By this point of view, the Channel State
Information (CSI) in SD-WC plays the role of the primary user’s
message in CIC which can be decoded at the eavesdropper. This
idea enables us to use the main achievability approaches of CIC,
i. e., Gel’fand-Pinsker Coding (GPC) and Superposition Coding
(SPC), to find new achievable equivocation-rates for the SD-
WC. We show that these approaches meet the capacity under
some constraints on the rate of the channel state. Similar to
the dirty paper channel, extending the results to the Gaussian
case shows that the GPC lead to the capacity of the Gaussian
SD-WC which is equal to the capacity of the wiretap channel
without channel state. Hence, we achieve the capacity of the
Gaussian SD-WC using the dirty paper technique. Moreover,
our proposed approaches provide the capacity of the Binary SD-
WC. It is shown that the capacity of the Binary SD-WC is equal
to the capacity of the Binary wiretap channel without channel
state.
Index Terms—Equivocation rate, channel capacity, wiretap
channel, channel state information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication from an information theoretic per-
spective attracts some attentions nowadays [1]–[5]. There are
a lot of works to study the secrecy problem in different channel
models, which are inspired of the wiretap channel as a basic
physical layer model [6]. All these attempts are based on
two principal elements: the Equivocation as a measurement
to evaluate the secrecy level at the eavesdropper which is
introduced by Shannon [7], and the Random Coding [6] as
a coding scheme which leads to the secrecy condition in the
wiretap channels (see [5] and the references therein).
Using the Channel State Information (CSI) in information
theoretic communication models was initiated by Shannon [8]
in which he considered the availability of CSI at the Transmit-
ter (CSIT). Gel’fand and Pinsker obtained the capacity of the
discrete memoryless channel with non-causal CSIT [9]. Their
main result was based on a binning scheme named Gel’fand-
Pinsker Coding (GPC), and it was shown that the capacity of
the Gaussian state-dependent channel is equal to the capacity
of a channel with no channel state [10]. This means that
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the transmitter, who knows the CSI non-causally, can adapt
its signal to the channel state such that the receiver senses
no interference [10], as if the receiver had knowledge of the
interference and could subtract it out. The name of the Dirty
Paper channel [10] is inspired of a spotted paper, one wish to
write on such that the reader can easily find the text.
Despite of all these works which are trying to cancel out the
channel state, the authors in [11] and [12] deal with the CSIT
in an innovative manner. In these works, the CSIT assumed
as the user’s signal which is wished to be sent through the
channel. In [12], the transmitter wishes to mask the CSI at the
legitimate receiver, whereas in [11] the transmitter wishes to
forward the CSI to the legitimate receiver. The achievable rate
in each case is derived and results to the trade-off between the
rates of the transmitter’s information and the CSI.
The State-Dependent Wiretap Channel (SD-WC) was stud-
ied in [1], [2]. In [1], the authors derived an achievable
equivocation-rate for the SD-WC in general case, and in [2]
the Gaussian SD-WC was considered. The main ideas of
these papers were based on using a combination of GPC
and random coding. In these works, it was assumed that the
eavesdropper has no access to the CSI. Therefore, the CSI
can be used potentially to improve the secrecy rate of the
SD-WC. Specially in Gaussian case, under some constraints,
the capacity was derived as the capacity of a channel [1], [2]
with no state. Afterward, [13] studied the SD-WC from the
secret-key sharing aspect. In this model, the channel state was
assumed as a key to achieve the secrecy rate. El-Gamal et. al.,
improved the equivocation-rate for the SD-WC in the case that
the channel state is known causally at both sides [14].
In this paper we study the SD-WC (see Fig. 1). We
consider the channel state sequence as a random sequence with
elements drawn from a finite alphabet, known non-causally at
the transmitter. The transmitter wishes to keep its message
secret from an external eavesdropper. A well known concept
is to cancel out the CSI using the GPC and use the random
coding to achieve the secrecy rate as [1]. We know from the
random coding idea [6] that we should randomize a part of the
message to confuse the eavesdropper which has less channel
capacity than the main channel. In this paper, we model the
CSI of SD-WC as the message of the primary user at CIC
and we use it at the transmitter to randomize a part of the
message. Our main idea relies on modeling the CSI with a
(primary) message, since both are known at the (cognitive)
transmitter [15], [16]. In this model, the transmitter of SD-
WC plays the role of the cognitive transmitter of CIC and
the CSI is considered as the message of the primary one.
The transmitter, similar to the cognitive one in CIC, tries
Fig. 1. The State-Dependent Wiretap Channel (SD-WC) in which the channel
state is assumed to be known non-causally at the transmitter.
to cancel out the CSI, equivalently the primary message, at
its destination with low enough information leakage of its
message to the eavesdropper, i. e., the primary receiver in
CIC. Then, we use the rate splitting and the interference
cancelation schemes as CICs in [15], [16], i. e., GPC and
Superposition Coding (SPC), to achieve the secrecy rate for
the SD-WC. At first, using these two coding schemes, we
derive two new achievable equivocation-rates for the SD-WC.
Then, we prove that these achievable equivocation-rates meet
the secrecy capacity under some constraints. As an example,
we show that the derived equivocation-rates meet the capacity
in the binary SD-WC. Afterward, we use these results in the
Gaussian SD-WC. We prove that the achievable equivocation-
rates for the SD-WC lead to the secrecy capacity using the
Dirty Paper Coding (DPC) [10] approach. On account of this
result, we call this approach as secure writing on dirty paper to
point to the problem of writing a message on a sheet of paper
covered with independent dirt spots, such that the reader can
distinguish the message, but the eavesdropper cannot do that.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
the channel model is introduced. In Section III the encoding
strategy for the point to point state-dependent communication
channel is explained. The main results on the achievable
equivocation-rates, the capacity of the SD-WC and the binary
example are presented in Section IV. In Section V, using DPC,
the capacity of the Gaussian SD-WC is derived and the paper
is concluded with some discussions in the last section.
II. CHANNEL MODEL, DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
First, we clear our notation in this paper. Let X be a
finite set. Denote its cardinality by |X |. If we consider XN ,
its members are xN = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ), where subscripted
letters denote the components and superscripted letters denote
the vector. A similar convention applies to random vectors
and random variables, which are denoted by uppercase let-
ters. Denote the zero mean Gaussian random variable with
variance P by N (0, P ). A Bernoulli random variable X
with Pr{X = 1} = P is denoted by X ∼ B(P ).
Consider the channel model shown in Fig. 1. Assume that
the state information of the channel, i.e., Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
is known at the transmitter non-causally. The transmitter
sends the message W which is uniformly distributed on the
set W ∈ {1, . . . ,M} to the legitimate receiver in N channel
uses. Based on the w and sN , the transmitter generates the
codeword xN to transmit through the channel. The decoder at
the legitimate receiver makes an estimation of the transmitted
message wˆ based on the channel output yN ; and zN is the
corresponding output at the eavesdropper. The channel is
memoryless, i.e.,
p(yN , zN |xN , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(yi, zi|xi, si). (1)
The secrecy level of the transmitter’s message at the eaves-
dropper is measured by normalized equivocation:
R(N)e =
1
N
H(W |ZN , SN ), (2)
in which we assume that the eavesdropper can decode the CSI.
The average probability of error Pe is given by
Pe =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Pr(wˆ(Y N ) 6= w). (3)
We define the rate of the transmission to the intended
receiver to be
R =
logM
N
. (4)
The rate-pair (R,Re) is achievable if for any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 there
exists an (M,N,Pe) code such that Pe ≤ ǫ, and the secrecy
rate Re is
0 ≤ Re ≤ lim inf
N→∞
R(N)e . (5)
We define the perfect secrecy condition as the case in which
we have R ≤ Re. Thus, under this condition, the sent message
to the legitimate receiver must be secure.
III. OVERVIEW OF ENCODING STRATEGY
Consider SD-WC in Fig. 1. Assume that the channel state S
plays the role of the codebook of rate RS = I(S;Y )
interfering with the communication of message W at the
rate R = I(X ;Y ). As proposed in [17], two coding strategy
can be used for this scenario: GPC scheme and SPC depending
on the interference’s rate RS . When RS is small, it can be
exploited for achieving the higher rates using the SPC. Using
the GPC, the interference is considered as a codebook with
rate RS . The following lemma expresses the result of using
these two coding schemes. This lemma is used to derive
the achievable equivocation-rate for the SD-WC in the next
section.
Lemma 1: [17, Lemma 1] The following rate is achievable
for a point to point communicating system with non-causal
CSIT
R ≤ max
PU|S ,x(u,s)
min{I(X ;Y |S),
max{I(U, S;Y )−RS , I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)}}. (6)
Outline Of the Proof: This lemma is proved in [17, Ap-
pendix B]. For the case I(S;U, Y ) ≤ RS ≤ H(S), the second
term of (6) is achievable using the GPC. For RS ≤ I(S;U, Y ),
the first term in (6) is achievable using the SPC.
Remark 1: Interestingly, in the case RS ≤ I(S;U, Y ), the
receiver decodes both the messages and the channel state, i.
e., the interference. A related model in which both data and
the channel state are decoded at the receiver was considered
by [11].
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Fig. 2. Gel’fand-Pinsker Coding (GPC) scheme for the
case min{I(S;U ;Y ); I(S;V ; Y |U)} ≤ RS ≤ H(S).
IV. RESULTS ON THE CAPACITY OF THE SD-WC
In this section, we provide two achievable equivocation-
rates for the SD-WC, shown in Fig. 1, in two cases, i. e.,
GPC and SPC.
A. Gel’fand-Pinsker Coding (GPC)
Assume that V and U are two random variables to construct
the private and the common messages, respectively. In the case
that min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)} ≤ RS ≤ H(S), using
GPC and the rate splitting, we have the following lemma for
the achievable equivocation-rate of the SD-WC.
Lemma 2 (Achievable equivocation-rate using GPC): The
set of rates (R,R1, R2, Re) satisfying
RGPC =
⋃
P (T )P (S,U,V,X|T )P (Y,Z|X,S)

(R,R1, R2, Re) :
R = R1 +R2
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U, T )− I(V ;S|U, T ),
R ≤ I(V, U ;Y |T )− I(V, U ;S|T ),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, T )− I(V ;S,Z|U, T ),


,
(7)
is achievable for SD-WC, in which the equations in the right-
hand-sides of (7) are non-negative and T is a time-sharing
random variable.
Outline of the Proof: The details of the proof are
relegated to the Appendix A based on the result of [15]. As an
outline, the message W is split into two messages W1 and W2
with denoted rates R1 and R2, respectively. In our scheme, W2
can be decoded at the eavesdropper and does not contribute
to the secrecy level of W at the eavesdropper. Therefore, W1
may be hidden from the unintended receiver. We model SD-
WC with a CIC with a confidential message [15], in which
the message of the primary transmitter plays the role of
CSI and the transmitter who knows CSI, can be considered
as the cognitive transmitter. By this setting, the proof of
Lemma 2 is deduced from the proof of [15, Theorem 1] in
which a cognitive radio tries to communicate with a related
destination through a main channel which belongs to a primary
transmitter-receiver pair. Therefore, the transmitter in SD-WC
(similar to the cognitive transmitter in CIC), can cancel the
channel state out at the corresponding receiver, using the
known CSI. The transmitter uses rate splitting scheme and
GPC by binning U against the channel state S, and binning V
against S conditioned on U . The GPC structure is shown in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 3. Superposition Coding (SPC) scheme for the case RS ≤
min{I(S;U ;Y ); I(S; V ; Y |U)}.
The perfect secrecy condition using the GPC scheme is
derived as follows.
Theorem 1 (Perfect secrecy condition using GPC): In the
case that min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)} ≤ RS ≤ H(S), the
perfect secrecy rate RGPCps satisfying
RGPCps =
⋃
PU,V,SPX|U,V,SPY,Z|X,S{
Re ≤ min{I(V, U ;Y )− I(V, U ;S),
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;S,Z|U)}
}
, (8)
is achievable for the SD-WC.
Proof: The proof of the theorem is strictly deduced
from Lemma 2 applying perfect secrecy condition and using
Fourier-Motzkin elimination [3].
Corollary 1: The following rate
R = max
PU,V,SPX|U,V,SPY,Z|X,S
I(V ;Y |S)
−max{I(V ;Z|S), H(S|Y )}, (9)
is an achievable secrecy rate for the SD-WC.
Proof: Substituting U = S in the proof of the Corollary 1
means that the transmitter sends the channel state S as a
part of its message. Thus, the channel state can be decoded
at the legitimate receiver. This setting is similar to the one
proposed by [11], in which the transmitter sends its data and
the information about the channel state to the receiver, without
secrecy issue.
Remark 2: The proof of the corollary is deduced directly
from Theorem 1 by substituting U = S and using Fourier-
Motzkin elimination [3]. Note that the transmitter which
knows CSI non-causally can use the channel state ransom
variable S as part of its message, i. e., the common one.
B. Superposition Coding (SPC)
Consider the case RS ≤ min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}.
From Lemma 1, we can superimpose UN and V N against SN
instead of using GPC. To derive the perfect secrecy rate for
the SD-WC in this case, first we present the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Achievable equivocation-rate using SPC): In
the case that RS ≤ min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}, the
3
Fig. 4. The results of the theorems 1 and 2, respect to the channel state
information rate RS .
following equivocation-rate is achievable for the SD-WC:
RSPC =
⋃
PU,V,SPX|U,V,SPY,Z|X,S

(R,Re) :
R ≤ I(U, V ;Y |S)
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S)− I(V ;Z|U, S)

 .
(10)
Outline of the Proof: The transmitter splits its mes-
sage W into two components W1 and W2 with denoted
rates R1 and R2, respectively. Modeling SD-WC with a CIC
with confidential message [16], the proof of the lemma is
deduced from the proof of the [16, Theorem 1] in which
the cognitive transmitter superimposes its message on the
primary transmitter’s message. In our approach, the transmitter
superimposes its message on the channel state sequence S to
derive the achievable equivocation-rate for the SD-WC. The
encoding structure in this case is shown in Fig. 3. More details
on the proof are relegated to the Appendix B.
Thus, using the superposition coding scheme, the following
theorem presents the perfect secrecy condition for the SD-WC.
Theorem 2 (Perfect secrecy condition using SPC): In the
case RS ≤ min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}, the perfect
secrecy rate RSPCps satisfying
RSPCps =
⋃
PU,V,SPX|U,V,SPY,Z|X,S{
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S)− I(V ;Z|U, S)}
}
, (11)
is achievable for SD-WC.
Proof: The proof is strictly deduced from the Lemma 3
applying perfect secrecy condition and using Fourier- Motzkin
elimination.
Fig. 4 shows the conditions of using GPC and SPC in
theorems 1 and 2 respect to the CSI rate RS .
Corollary 2: The rate
R = max
PU,V,SPX|U,V,SPY,Z|X,S
{I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S)},(12)
is an achievable secrecy rate for the SD-WC in the case
that RS ≤ min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}.
Proof: The proof of the corollary is deduced directly from
Theorem 2 by substituting U = ∅ and using Fourier-Motzkin
elimination [3].
C. Capacity of the SD-WC
Now, we have the following theorem to explain the secrecy
capacity of the SD-WC in general case.
Theorem 3 (Secrecy Capacity): In the cases that
RS ≤ min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}, (13)
or
RS ≥ max
{
min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)},
I(V, U ;S)− I(U ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S)
}
, (14)
the secrecy capacity (CS) of the SD-WC is as follows
CS = max
PSPU,V |SPX|U,V,SPY,Z|X,S
{
I(V ;Y |U, S)
−I(V ;Z|U, S)
}
. (15)
Proof: The achievability of (15) is derived directly from
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. In more detail, in the case
that RS ≤ min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}, the rate (15) is
achievable for the SD-WC by using SPC as Theorem 2. In the
case that max{min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}, I(V, U ;S) −
I(U ;Y |S)−I(V ;Z|S)} ≤ RS , GPC achieves the rate (15), by
using Theorem 1 and substituting U = (U, S). The converse
proof is relegated to the Appendix C.
Remark 3: The capacity of the SD-WC in Theorem 3, in
the case that U = S = ∅, is reduced to the capacity of the
wiretap channel without channel state information.
Corollary 3: In the case that Y is more capable than Z ,
i. e., I(X ;Y |U) ≥ I(X ;Z|U) for all p(x), and under the
conditions (13)–(14), the secrecy capacity of the SD-WC is as
follows
CS = max
PSPX|SPY,Z|X,S
{
I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S)
}
. (16)
Proof: The achievability of (16) is directly proved by
substituting U = ∅, V = X in Theorem 3. To prove the
converse, we have
I(V ;Y |U, S) − I(V ;Z|U, S)
= I(X,V ;Y |U, S)− I(X,V ;Z|U, S)
−[I(X ;Y |U, S, V )− I(X ;Z|U, S, V )]
= I(X ;Y |U, S)− I(X ;Z|U, S)
+[I(V ;Y |U, S,X)− I(V ;Z|U, S,X)]
−[I(X ;Y |U, S, V )− I(X ;Z|U, S, V )]
(a)
= I(X ;Y |U, S)− I(X ;Z|U, S)
−[I(X ;Y |U, S, V )− I(X ;Z|U, S, V )]
(b)
≤ I(X ;Y |U, S)− I(X ;Z|U, S), (17)
where (a) is due to the Markov chain relationship (U, V ) →
(X,S) → (Y, Z) which implies that [I(V ;Y |U, S,X) −
I(V ;Z|U, S,X)] = 0; and (b) is derived by using the more
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capable condition. Now, we have
I(X ;Y |U, S) − I(X ;Z|U, S)
= I(U,X ;Y |S)− I(U,X ;Z|S)
−[I(U,X ;Y |S)− I(U,X ;Z|S)]
= I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S)
+[I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S)]
−[I(U,X ;Y |S)− I(U,X ;Z|S)]
(c)
≤ I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S), (18)
where (c) is derived by using the the Markov chain relation-
ship and the more capable condition.
1) An Example (Binary SD-WC): As an example, consider
the Binary SD-WC (BSD-WC), in which the channel outputs
are described as
Y = X ⊕ S ⊕ η1, (19)
Z = X ⊕ S ⊕ η2, (20)
where η1 ∼ B(N1), η2 ∼ B(N2) and S ∼ B(Q). For this
channel we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4: When
RS ≤ I(S;Y ), (21)
or
RS ≥ max{I(S;Y ), I(X ;S)− I(X ;Z|S)}, (22)
the secrecy capacity of the BSD-WC is
CBSD−WCS = [H(N2)−H(N1)]
+, (23)
in which [x]+ = max{0, x}.
Proof: Substituting U = ∅, V = X in Theorem 3 leads
to the secrecy capacity as following under the conditions (21)-
(22)
C
′
S = max
PSPX|SPY,Z|X,S
I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S). (24)
Let X ∼ B(P ) which is independent of S. Note that the nature
of the BSC forces us to choose Bernoulli distribution function
for the channel input.Now, we have
I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S)
= H(Y |S)−H(Y |X,S)−H(Z|S) +H(Z|X,S)
= H(X ⊕ η1)−H(η1)−H(X ⊕ η2) +H(η2)
= H(N2)−H(N1)− [H(P ∗N2)−H(P ∗N1)], (25)
in which P ∗ u = P (1 − u) + (1 − P )u and H(Ni) =
−Ni log(Ni)− (1−Ni) log(1−Ni), i = {1, 2} is the binary
entropy function. For P < 12 , the function P ∗ u is mono-
tonically increasing in u ∈ [0, 1/2]. Hence, setting P = 1/2
we have H(P ∗ N2) − H(P ∗ N1) = 0 which achieves the
maximum of I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) as H(N2)−H(N1). In
the case that N1 ≤ N2 the right hand side of (25) is negative. It
means that the eavesdropper can decode any message intended
for the receiver. The proof of the converse is directly derived
from Corollary 3 which implies that the right-hand-side of (24)
is an outer bound on the capacity of the model in which the
Fig. 5. Gaussian state-dependent wiretap channel.
legitimate receiver is more capable than the eavesdropper. This
completes the proof.
Remark 4: The capacity of the BSD-WC under the con-
ditions (21) and (22), is equal to the capacity of the binary
wiretap channel without channel state. It means that the coding
schemes used in the theorems 1 and 2 cancels the channel state
out to meet the capacity.
V. GAUSSIAN SD-WC: DIRTY PAPER SCHEME
In this section, we extend the results of the theorems 1
and 2 to the Gaussian SD-WC (GSD-WC). First, consider the
GSD-WC (Fig. 5) which is described as follows.
Y = X + S + η1,
Z = X + S + η2, (26)
where X denotes the channel input and Y and Z denote the
channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper,
respectively. ηi ∼ N(0, Ni), i ∈ {1, 2} is Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN), and we assume the channel state
random variable as S ∼ N(0, Q). Now, we have the following
theorem for the GSD-WC.
Theorem 5: The secrecy capacity of the GSD-WC is
CGSD−WCS = [C(
P
N1
)− C(
P
N2
)]+, (27)
in which C(x) = 12 log(1 + x).
Proof: The proof the achievability of the rate (27) is
derived from Theorem 1 and 2 as follows:
First, we assume the channel input as X ∼ N(0, P ) which
is independent of the channel state sequence and the AWGNs.
Then, we use the Dirty Paper approach [10] on theorems 1
and 2, directly. For this, we split the channel input as X =
X1 +X2 +
√
α¯
P
Q, in which X1 is related to the confidential
message and X2 is related to the common message which
reduces the interference at the legitimate receiver, and we have
X1 ∼ N (0, αβ¯P ), (28)
X2 ∼ N (0, αβP ), (29)
where 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1 are the power coefficients for sending
the confidential and the common messages in the transmitter,
respectively. Also we define α¯ = 1− α, β¯ = 1− β.
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Let the axillary random variables V and U as
V = X1 + λ1S, (30)
U = X2 + λ2S (31)
in which the transmitter uses 0 ≤ λ1, λ2 ≤ 1 to bin its
message against the state of the channel as GPC. Note that
in the SPC the transmitter does not forward the channel
state, and the channel state is not contained in V . Thus, in
SPC case, we should substitute λ1 = 0. Now, we find the
variables α, β, λ1, λ2 which maximize the achievable secrecy
rate of Theorem 1 leading to the capacity of GSD-WC.
Based on Theorem 1, for the GPC case, we can define
Re1 , I(V, U ;Y )− I(V, U ;S)
= H(V, U |S)−H(V, U |Y ),
Re2 , I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;S,Z|U)
= H(V |U)−H(V |Y, U)
−H(S,Z|U) +H(S,Z|U, V ). (32)
Now, we calculate each term of (32) using the standard
approach [18] yielding (33)-(38) in top of the next page.
Taking derivatives of Re1 with respect to λ1 and λ2 and setting
to zero yields
λˆ1 =
αβ¯P (K + 1)
αP +N1
(39)
λˆ1 =
αβP (K + 1)
αP +N1
(40)
Then, we substitute these optimal variables in (32) to get
Re1(λˆ1, λˆ2) = C
[αP
N1
]
, (41)
Re2(λˆ1, λˆ2) = C
[αP
N1
]
− C
[αP
N2
]
. (42)
Next, we optimize (41)-(42) with respect to α and β. In the
case N1 > N2, the derived result of Re2 is a decreasing func-
tion with respect to α and β¯. Thus, this function is maximized
at α = β¯ = 0, and λ1 = λ2 = 0. Therefore, the achievable
rates are equal to zero for this case, i.e., Re1 = Re2 = 0.
In the case that N1 < N2, Re2 is an increasing function
with respect to α and β¯. Thus, this function is maximized
at α∗ = β¯∗ = 1. Finally, the variables α∗ = 1, β∗ = 0, λ∗1 =
P
P+N1
, λ∗2 = 0 leads the secrecy achievable rate of Theorem
1 to
R∗e = min{Re1(λ1, λ2), Re2(λ1, λ2)}
= C
( P
N1
)
− C
( P
N2
)
. (43)
We conclude that for the GPC for all cases of N1 and N2
the secrecy achievable rate is as follows
R∗e−GPC =
[
C(
P
N1
)− C(
P
N2
)
]+
. (44)
Note that the necessary condition, in Theorem 1, under
which the GPC gives the secrecy achievable rate, is satisfied
and discussed in Remark 5.
Now, based on Theorem 2 for the SPC case, we can define
V = X, (45)
U = ∅. (46)
substituting these parameters in (11) we have
I(V ;Y |U, S)− I(V ;Z|U, S)
= I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S)
= H(Y |S)−H(Y |X,S)−H(Z|S) +H(Z|X,S)
= H(X + η1)−H(η1)−H(X + η2) +H(η2)
= C(
P
N1
)− C(
P
N2
), (47)
which means that the chosen parameters in (45)-(46), lead
Theorem 2 to the following secrecy achievable rate
R∗e−SPC =
[
C(
P
N1
)− C(
P
N2
)
]+
. (48)
Note that the necessary condition, in Theorem 2, under
which the SPC gives the secrecy achievable rate, is satisfied
and discussed in Remark 5.
For the converse proof, using the fact that the legitimate
receiver is more capable than the wiretapper, we can use the
result of Corollary 3. Thus, we should prove that choosing
the Gaussian distribution for the channel input, maximizes the
achievable rate to the capacity of the wiretap cannel without
channel state. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the channel is physically degraded, i. e., η2 = η1 + η
′
2, in
which η′2 ∼ N(0, N2 − N1). For the outer bound on the
capacity of the channel we have
I(X ;Y |S) − I(X ;Z|S)
= I(X ;X + η1)− I(X ;X + η2)
= H(X + η1)−H(η1)−H(X + η2) +H(η2)
=
1
2
log
(N2
N1
)
− [H(X + η2)−H(X + η1)].(49)
Then, by substituting M = X + η1 we have
H(X + η2) − H(X + η1)
= H(M + η
′
2)−H(M)
(c)
≥
1
2
log(22H(η
′
2
) + 22H(M))−H(M)
=
1
2
log(2πe(N2 −N1) + 2
2H(M))−H(M),(50)
where (c) is derived by the entropy power inequality (EPI) [3].
Moreover, 12 log(2πe(N2−N1)+ 2
2H(u))−H(u) is a mono-
tonic increasing function with respect to u and H(M) ≤
1
2 log(2πe(P +N1)). Thus, we have
H(X + η2) − H(X + η1)
≥
1
2
log(2πe(N2 −N1) + 2πe(P +N1))
−
1
2
log(2πe(P +N1))
=
1
2
log
(P +N2
P +N1
)
. (51)
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H(V, U |S) =
1
2
log[(2πe)2α2ββ¯P 2], (33)
H(V, U |Y ) =
1
2
log
[
(2πe)2{(αβP + λ22Q)(αβ¯P + λ
2
1Q)− λ
2
1λ
2
2Q
2 +
A
B
}
]
, (34)
H(V |U) =
1
2
log
[
(2πe){(αβ¯P + λ21Q)−
λ21λ
2
2Q
2
αβP + λ22Q
}
]
(35)
H(V |Y, U) =
1
2
log
[
(2πe){(αβ¯P + λ21Q)− λ
2
1λ
2
2Q
2 +
C
D
}
]
, (36)
H(S,Z|U) =
1
2
log
[
(2πe){
αβPQ
αβP + λ22Q
}
]
+ log
[
(2πe){αβ¯P +N2}
]
(37)
H(S,Z|U, V ) =
1
2
log
[
(2πe){
α2ββ¯P 2Q
α2ββ¯P 2 + λ21αβPQ+ λ
2
2αβ¯PQ
}
]
+ log[(2πe)N2] (38)
in which
A = −(αβP + λ22Q)(αβ¯P + λ1Q(K + 1))
2 − (αβ¯P + λ21Q)(αβP + λ2Q(K + 1))
2
+2λ1λ2Q(αβ¯P + λ1Q(K + 1))(αβP + λ2Q(K + 1))
B = P + (2K + 1)Q+N1
C = −(λ1λ2Q)
2(P + (2K + 1)Q+N1)− (αβP + λ
2
2Q)(αβ¯P + λ1Q(K + 1))
2
+2λ1λ2Q(αβ¯P + λ1Q(K + 1))(αβP + λ2Q(K + 1))
D = (αβP + λ22Q)(P + (2K + 1)Q+N1)− (αβP + λ2Q(K + 1))
2
K =
√
α¯P
Q
,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− −−−−−−−−−−−
Finally, we have
I(X ;Y |S) − I(X ;Z|S)
≥
1
2
log
(N2
N1
)
−
1
2
log
(P +N2
P +N1
)
= C(
P
N1
)− C(
P
N2
), (52)
and the equality is attained by choosing X ∼ N (0, P ).
Remark 5: We should note that GPC is used in the case
that min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)} ≤ RS ≤ H(S). By
substituting the optimal parameters α∗ = 1, β∗ = 0, λ∗1 =
P
P+N1
, λ∗2 = 0, this condition is reduced to I(S;Y ) ≤
RS ≤ H(S). On the other hand, SPC is used when RS ≤
min{I(S;U, Y ), I(S;V, Y |U)}, which by substituting R.V.s
as (45)-(46), we have RS ≤ I(S;Y ). As shown in Fig. 6, our
proposed coding schemes meet the capacity for any RS . Note
that in the Gaussian case, I(S;Y ) = C( Q
P+N1
).
Remark 6: In GPC scheme, choosing α∗ = β¯∗ = 1
and λ∗1, λ∗2 results in
V = X +
( P
P +N1
)
S,
U = ∅, (53)
and it is noticeable that the parameter λ∗1 = PP+N1 is similar
to the one chosen in dirty paper channel [10] to achieve
the capacity in the state-dependent channel. This inspired the
authors to name the proposed method Secure Dirty Paper
Coding (SDPC).
Fig. 6. The conditions under which GPC (by substituting R.V.s as V =
X + ( P
P+N1
)S) and SPC (by substituting R.V.s V = X;U = ∅) are used
in Gaussian state-dependent wiretap channel.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we derived two equivocation-rates for the
state-dependent wiretap channel in which the channel state
information is assumed to be known non-causally at the
transmitter. These equivocation-rates are derived from the
equivocation-rate regions reported for the cognitive interfer-
ence channel [15], [16]. Comparing our model to the cognitive
interference channel, the channel state plays the role of the
message of the primary user. The transmitter uses the coding
schemes previously used by the cognitive transmitter, i.e.
Gel’fand-Pinsker coding and superposition coding. By this
point of view, we derived new achievable equivocation-rates
for the state-dependent wiretap channel. Then, we showed
that the derived equivocation-rates meet the capacity of the
state-dependent wiretap channel under some conditions. As
an example, the secure capacity of a state-dependent binary
symmetric channel was considered which confirms the gen-
eral results. Afterward, the state-dependent Gaussian wiretap
channel was studied, and our achievable equivocation-rates
lead to the capacity in Gaussian case. It was shown that the
capacity of the state-dependent Gaussian wiretap channel is
equal to the capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel without
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channel state. This result was derived using dirty paper coding
approach [10], by maximizing the equivocation-rates. The
authors called this coding scheme Secure Dirty Paper Coding.
To compare our model with the one presented in [1], we
should note that in [1], the transmitter which non-causally
knows the CSI, uses this information to increase its secrecy
rate to RChen−V inck = I(V ;Y ) − max{I(V ;S), I(V ;Z)}.
Therein, it is assumed that the CSI is not known at the
eavesdropper. Thus, in the case that I(V ;S) ≥ I(V ;Z),
binning the codewords into 2nI(V ;S) bins, overcomes the
channel state, and in this case the message will be kept
secure by the random coding scheme. In Gaussian case,
when I(V ;S) ≥ I(V ;Z), this approach leads to the capacity
of the point to point channel, i. e., 12 log(1+
P
N1
). Furthermore,
the output of the channel at the eavesdropper assumed to be
a degraded version of the one at the legitimate receiver, i. e.,
the U → (X,S) → Y → Z forms a Markov chain in [1].
But in the model considered in this paper, the CSI can be
decoded at the eavesdropper. Thus, the CSI cannot be used to
improve the secrecy rate in SD-WC. It is noticeable that due to
the capability of the eavesdropper to estimate the channel, the
assumption that the CSI can be decoded at the eavesdropper
sounds a little realistic. Moreover, in our model it is not
necessary to assume the channel output at the eavesdropper
to be a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s one.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 2
The SD-WC is modeled with a CIC, i. e., the CSI is
considered as a primary transmitter’s message and thus is
transmitted through the channel; and the transmitter in SD-
WC plays the role of a cognitive transmitter who has the
message of the primary one non-causally. On the other hand,
the transmitted message in SD-WC must be confidential at the
primary receiver who acts as an eavesdropper for the cognitive
transmitter’s message. First, note that in [15] two confidential
messages are considered in CIC model, i. e., the primary and
the cognitive receivers act as eavesdroppers for each other’s
message. Here, we just consider the cognitive transmitter’s
message to be confidential at the primary receiver. Hence, we
reduce the rate region of [15] to the CIC with one confidential
message by excluding extra secrecy condition. Thus, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 4: [15, Theorem 1] The set of the
rates (R1, R2a , Rc, Re2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X1;U, Y1|T ), (54)
R2a ≤ I(V ;Y2|U, T )− I(V ;X1|U, T ), (55)
R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Y2|T )− I(U, V ;X1|T ), (56)
R1 +Rc ≤ I(X1, U ;Y1|T ), (57)
Re2 ≤ I(V ;Y2|U, T )− I(V ;X1, Y1|U, T ), (58)
is achievable for CIC with a confidential message.
Now, comparing the SD-WC (Fig. 1) with the CIC (Fig. 7),
we can derive a new achievable rate for the SD-WC. We should
note that the message of the primary transmitter plays the role
of the channel sate in SD-WC. Since the eavesdropper is not
Fig. 7. Cognitive interference channel with a confidential messages.
forced to decode the channel state in SD-WC, we should relax
the terms contain R1 which is related to the rate of the primary
transmitter’s message (the channel state in SD-WC). Thus, by
setting
W2 = W,R1 = RS , R2a = R1,
Rc = R2, Re2 = Re,
R = R1 +R2,
Y1 = Z, Y2 = Y,
X1 = S,X2 = X, (59)
and relaxing the rates (48) and (51), we derive the
equivocation-rate of Lemma 2. Finally, we remark that we
can derive the equivocation-rate of Lemma 2 directly by
introducing the codebook generation, encoding and decoding
schemes, error analysis and equivocation computation similar
to the one presented in [15].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 3
Consider the CIC with one confidential message (Fig. 7).
Using the SPC, the achievable equivocation-rate region for this
channel is derived by [16] as follows.
Lemma 5: [16, Theorem 1] The set of the
rates (R1, R2, Re) satisfying
R1 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)} (60)
R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Z|X1), (61)
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}
+I(V ;Z|U,X1), (62)
Re ≤ I(V ;Z|U,X1)− I(V ;Y |U,X1), (63)
is achievable for CIC with a secret message.
Now, by substituting R2 = R,X1 = S and relaxing
the rates (60) and (62) which correspond to the primary
user (channel state in our setting) the achievability of the
equivocation-rate of Lemma 3 is proved.
APPENDIX C
THE CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The converse proof of Theorem 3 is derived as follows.
Consider the rate-pair (R,Re) to be achievable. Then, we have
NR
(a)
≤ I(W ;Y N )− I(W ;ZN , SN) + ǫ
≤ I(W ;Y N |SN )− I(W ;ZN |SN ) + ǫ
≤
N∑
i=1
I(W ;Yi|Y
i−1, SN)− I(W ;Zi|ZNi+1, S
N) + ǫ
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(b)
≤
N∑
i=1
I(W,ZNi+1;Yi|Y
i−1, SN )
−I(W,Y i−1;Zi|ZNi+1, S
N ) + ǫ
(c)
≤
N∑
i=1
I(W ;Yi|Y
i−1, ZNi+1, S
N )
−I(W ;Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, S
N ) + ǫ
(d)
=
N∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ui, Si)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui, Si) + ǫ
(e)
= I(V ;Y |U, S)− I(V ;Z|U, S) + ǫ
(64)
in which (a) follows from the Fano’s inequality and the
fact that I(W ;ZN , SN ) tends to zero for N → ∞; (b)
and (c) follow from the Csisza´r sum identity [3]; (d)
is derived by substituting the random variables Ui =
(Y i−1, ZNi+1, S
i−1, SNi+1), Vi = (W,Ui), and (e) follows by
defining a time-sharing random variable Q and defining U =
(UQ, Q), V = (VQ, Q), Y = Y Q, and Z = ZQ. This
completes the proof.
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